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X-by-Wire and Safety assessment: which issue?
Critical functions 
- Steering according to the 
drivers’ request
- Force feedback to the 
steering wheel
Drivers’request
Filtering, …
Control law
Steering system
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X-by-Wire and Safety assessment: which issue?
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TDMA protocol (Time Division Multiplexed Access)
TTP/C
Slot: time interval for a node to send a message (frame)
Round (cycle): a sequence of slots such as each
node sends one and only one time (TTP/C)
Node 
A
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TDMA protocol (Time Division Multiplexed Access)
TTP/C
Slot: time interval for a node to emit a message (frame)
Round: a sequence of slots such as each node emit
one and only one time (TTP/C)
Node 
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TDMA protocol - Fault Tolerant Unit (FTU)
• FTU: redundant nodes 
•perform identical computations
•message redundancy in each TDMA round
Node 
A2
Node 
A1
a1 a2
tBus
round
FTU
a2a1
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TDMA protocol for X-by-Wire systems
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Impact of EMI perturbation on a TDMA-based 
communication system
 
Control law
OK OK KO KO
KOOK
OK KO KO KO OK OK
KOOK OK
• Quality, performances 
dependability of the system ?
• Safety of the vehicle ?
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Standard and Certification
A Steer-by-Wire system is a Safety Critical System 
Probability to have a critical failure in one hour < 10-8
(IEC 61508 / SIL4)
Verification on an Operational Architecture?
Regulatory laws Certification and standard
Quantitative evaluation of the safety
10
Industrial requirement
-Mechanical / hydraulical components - architectures
-Electronic devices
- ???? Behavior of software architecture (tasks, messages)
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A contribution to the safety assement of X-
by-Wire systems
Quantitative evaluation of a failure probability 
– extreme situation for the vehicle (worst case)
– focus on the communication and EMI perturbations
• TDMA-based protocol
• Granularity: one TDMA cycle
– transient faults (EMI perturbations): from transient faults to 
vehicle failure
– metric and means for safety evaluation
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Leading angles of the method
Robustness of the control law
System possibly perturbated
– How?
– How long?
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Robustness of the control law
Control law used as a black box
Matlab / Simulink model 
– of the vehicle (SimulinkCar – PSA Peugeot-Citroën)
– of the control law
for an « extreme » situation of the vehicle (worst 
case)
Fault injection + Simulations 2 results
– Acceptable length of the TDMA cycle 
– Maximal number of consecutive lost TDMA cycles - ηmax
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How is a TDMA cycle affected by a 
perturbation?
Error model
– Obtained by measurement
– Know-how of PSA Peugeot-Citroën
result 
Perr, probability for a TDMA cycle to be fully 
corrupted when the network is submitted to a 
perturbation
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How long is a perturbation?
Electric field level of a reference road
– Based on the results of a French project
– Measured on board
– Assuming a tolerance level of embedded electronic 
components
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Tolerated by 
in-vehicle 
electronic
components
How long is a perturbation?
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How long is a perturbation?
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Technical solutions
Given:
– ηmax : tolerance (consecutive corrupted TDMA cycles)
– ηwc : length of the perturbation (TDMA cycles) - extreme
situation for the vehicle, worst case of perturbation cover
– Perr: probability for one TDMA cycle to be corrupted
Problem:
determine the probability to have more 
than ηmax consecutive corrupted cycles 
in ηwc cycles (under Perr): 
Pfail(ηmax,ηWC,Perr) 
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Technical solutions
Similar to « consecutive-k-out-of-n:F » systems -
C(k,n:F)
– System = ordered sequence of n components
– The system fails if and only if more than k consecutive 
components fail
– Ln: number of consecutive failed components
(n 1) /(k 1)
m m k m 1
m 0
m k n m k
( , ; ) ( 1) p q q
m 1 m
R n k p
+ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ −
=
⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
= − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑
w ith 1q p= −
( ) ( , ; )nP L k R k n p< =
[Burr,1961], [Lambridis,1985], [Hwang,1986]
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Technical solution
Recurrent relation:
( 1) ( ) ( ) for 
( ) 1 for 0 1
( ) 1
k
k k k
k
k
k
u x u x qp u n k x k
u x x k
u k p
+ = − − ≥
= ≤ ≤ −
= −
( ) ( , ; )ku n R k n p=
3  and 0,1n p≥ ∈ ⎤ ⎡⎦ ⎣
Pfail(ηmax,ηWC,Perr) = 1-R(ηmax,ηWC;Perr)
= 1-uηmax (ηWC )
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Case study: a Steer-by-Wire system
Drivers’request
Filtering, …
Control law
-extreme situation
vehicle speed (90 km/h)
sharp turning
perturbated area = 2s
-robustness
ηmax = 7 TDMA cycles
-impact of the EMI perturbation
Perr = 5 10-3
-duration of the possibly perturbated area
ηWC = 336 TDMA cycles
Pfail(ηmax,ηWC,Perr) = 2.87 10-8
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Case study: configuration of a system
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Conclusions
A contribution to the dependability evaluation of 
an embedded system
– Transient fault at communication level to safety property 
at vehicle level
– Mathematical evaluation / simulation
Generalisation
– Perr variable (error pattern, Markov process)
– Other systems (e.g., dependability for application based 
on wireless networks)
